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NOTES
SERVICE OVER THE "NET":
PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW IN
CONFLICT
I. NTRODUCTION
The contractual arrangements for commercial transactions over the
Internet1 are still in their infancy with respect to the security of the
transaction,2 the scope and terms of the agreement, and the availabil-
ity of remedies. Many of the contracts currently on the Internet are
drafted in accordance with the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.).
3
The U.C.C., however, is applicable only to transactions involving the
sale of goods. In contrast, the vast majority of vendors and customers
engaging in transactions over the Internet contract for services, in-
cluding financial transactions, reservation services and electronic sub-
scriptions. Legislation and case law have recently begun to respond
to the unique nature of Internet-based contracts. 4 The U.C.C. is also
1 The Supreme Court recently had occasion to explore the dynamics of the Internet and its
well known method of communication-the World Wide Web-in Reno v. American Civil
Liberties Union, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). "The Internet," the majority opinion states, "is an
international network of interconnected computers." Id. at 2334. The World Wide Web is a
method of communication over the Internet that "allows users to search for and retrieve infor-
mation stored in remote computers, as well as, in some cases, to communicate back to desig-
nated sites .... The Webis... a vast library including millions of readily available and indexed
publications and a sprawling mall offering goods and services." Id. at 2335.
2 See Carol Levin, Beware the Backlash: Is the Web Risky Business?, PC MAG., Feb. 18,
1997, at28 (citing a survey by Netcraft and O'Reilly & Associates concluding that less than 1%
of Web sites are able to conduct secure transactions using encryption and authentication); Mar-
garet Mannix, Have I Got a Deal for You! The Internet Hosts a New Breed of Con Artists and
Hucksters, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Oct. 27, 1997, at 59 (summarizing the various crimes
perpetrated on the Internet).
3 See Fred M. Greguras, et al., Electronic Commerce: On-Line Contract Issues, 452
PLI/PAT 11, 15 (1996) ("As a practical matter, many vendors assume the UCC applies when
they design their agreements.").
4 Most efforts have concentrated on the authenticity of digital signatures. Several states, led
by Utah, have begun drafting legislation establishing and defining the authenticity of digital
signatures. See Utah Digital Signature Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3 (1998). At least one state,
Louisiana, has also passed legislation enforcing software licensing agreements. See Software
License Enforcement Act, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:1961 (West 1987). But see Vault Corp. v.
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being reworked to recognize electronic commerce.5 These efforts
have been slow to unfold and, as a consequence, legal questions with
respect to service contracts on the Internet remain unanswered. While
the common law and Article 2 of the U.C.C. both provide a frame-
work for the legal analysis of service contracts on the Internet, neither
rule regime adequately accounts for the unique nature of the medium
of such contracts.
This Note first examines, in Part HI, the background of the rule re-
gime conflict arising from service transactions over the Internet. This
discussion focuses on the pending release of Article 2B relating to
licenses and the issue of U.C.C. applicability to Internet transactions
that involve services, including mixed transactions. Part III demon-
strates why the current U.C.C. provisions and the common law rules
of contract law do not adequately provide for issues relating to con-
tract formation, contract terms and damages. Finally, this Note con-
cludes by pointing to Article 2B as the best available alternative for
providing a commercially efficient rule regime for such contracts.
11. BACKGROUND
A. U.C.C. Article 2B
For the past several years, efforts have been undertaken to adapt
the U.C.C. to the unique nature of Internet commerce, most notably
through the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL) and the American Law Institute's (ALI) draft of
Article 2B entitled "Software Contracts and Licenses of Informa-
tion.",6  The draft provisions of Article 2B would resolve the confu-
sion, highlighted in Part 11(B) of this Note, as to whether service con-
tracts over the Internet should be governed by the U.C.C. or the
common law rules of contract law by explicitly including these types
Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750, 763 (E.D. La. 1987), affd, 847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir.
1988) (invalidating portions of the Software License Enforcement Act to the extent they conflict
with the Federal Copyright Act).
5 See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Commercial
Code Article 2B: Software Contracts and Licenses of Information (AL Council Draft, Dec.
1998) (visited Dec. 30, 1998) <http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ucc2b/2bALId98.htm>
[hereinafter Article 2B].6 As of the date of publication of this Note, the current draft (December 1998) of Article 2B
can be accessed on the NCCUSL's official Web site at htttp://www.law.upenn.edullibrary/ulc
ucc2b/2bALId98.htm. "Proposed Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code, currently in the
drafting stages, is designed to create an enforceable regime for shrink-wrap, click-wrap [see
infra note 119] and other electronic licensing schemes." William A. Streff, Jr. & Jeffrey S.
Norman, Courts, UCC Tackle Shrinkwrap Licenses, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 14, 1997, at S6.
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of contracts within its scope.7 State legislatures are expected to begin
consideration of the adoption of Article 2B by the year 2000.8 How-
ever, as there is still a heated division over the scope of Article 2B,9
uniform adoption by the states is dubious. Hence, the current U.C.C.
and the common law will continue, at least for the foreseeable future,
to be relevant rule regimes for service contracts over the Internet.
B. Service Contracts, Mixed Contracts and the U. C. C.
1. Online Businesses
While businesses have found the transition to the Internet for
U.C.C.-related commerce relatively smooth, a vast portion of the
business transacted on the Internet involves services, most notably in
the areas of securities, airline and banking transactions. Retail secu-
rities brokerages have been quick to take advantage of investor de-
mand for immediate and efficient access to their accounts. 10 The Web
pages established in response to these demands now allow customers
to buy and sell securities online and to access proprietary market re-
search. Major airlines have also created Web pages that allow cus-
tomers to purchase tickets, make reservations and access their fre-
quent flier accounts." Finally, banks have established Web pages
that allow their customers to access their accounts in order to check
their balances, transfer monies, and open and close accounts.
12
7 See Article 2B, supra note 5, § 2B-103(a) ("This article applies to computer information
transactions."). Section 2B-103(d) allows parties involved in service transactions to select Arti-
cle 2B as governing law. See id. § 2B-103(d) ("The parties may by agreement provide that all or
part of this article, including contract formation rules, governs a transaction in whole or in part
or that other law governs the transaction in whole or in part.").
8 See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, NCCUSL and AL
Announce Schedule for Completion of Uniform Commercial Code Article 2B-Licensing (vis-
ited Dec. 29, 1998) <http:llwww.law.upenn.edullibrary/ulclucc2b/2breleas.htm>.
9 See Joseph P. Verdon, Article 2B: Transactions in Software and 'Information', N.Y.L.J.,
Aug. 13, 1997, at 1 (noting the participation of the software, on-line, publishing, motion picture
and banking industries in the drafting committee meetings and the struggle of the committee to
define the scope of Article 2B).
10 See, e.g., Charles Schwab & Co., CharlesSchwab (visited Dec. 30, 1998)
<http://www.schwab.com>; Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Co., DLI Direct (visited Dec. 30,
1998) <http://www.dljdirect.com>; E"TRADE Securities Inc., Welcome to E*TRADE (visited
Dec. 30, 1998) <http://www.etrade.com>.
i1 See, e.g., American Airlines Inc., AmericanAirlines (visited Dec. 30, 1998)
<http://www.americanair.com>; Delta Air Lines, Delta Air Lines SkyLinks (visited Dec. 30,
1998) <http://www.delta-air.com>; Northwest Airlines, Sign In (visited Dec. 30, 1998)
<http://www.fiynwa.com>; Southwest Airlines Co., Southwest Airlines Home Gate (visited Dec.
30, 1998) <http://www.iflyswa.com>; Trans World Airlines, Welcome to twa.com (visited Dec.
30, 1998) <http://www.twa.com>.
12 See, e.g., Citibank, Citibank (visited Dec. 30, 1998) <http://www.citibank.com>; Fifth
Third Bank, Fifth Third Online (visited Dec. 30, 1998) <http://www.fifththird.com>; First Un-
ion Corp., First Union (visited Dec. 30, 1998) <http://www.firstunion.com>; Huntington Banks,
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2. The "Shrinkwrap" Cases
Businesses readily understand the cost savings and customer
service potential of Internet-based commerce 3 and are rapidly in-
creasing such services. 14  A substantial portion of this type of com-
merce involves proprietary information and the services that organize
and distribute such information. Coinciding with this rapid expansion
of business transactions utilizing the Internet has been the inability of
current law to meet the unique legal issues raised by such transac-
tions.
Although no court in the United States has yet to publish a deci-
sion involving an Internet service contract, the judiciary has already
been exposed to transactions involving computer software and the
question of whether such software is a "good" subject to governance
by the U.C.C. The definition of "goods" under the U.C.C. is under-
standably broad and ambiguous in its aim to cast as wide a net as pos-
sible over transactions in tangible goods and, thus, is subject to differ-
ent interpretations, particularly when applied to computer software.
15
In addition, since software is almost always sold subject to the terms
of a license restricting its use or dissemination, 16 the question arises
Huntington.com (visited Dec. 30, 1998) <http://www.huntington.com>; KeyBank, Your Life.
Your Goals. Your Success. With Key, You Get Help at Every Turn (visited Dec. 30, 1998)
<http:llwww.keybank.com>.
13 See Jube Shriver Jr., The New Mark@place, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1997, at D1 (main-
taining the boom in electronic commerce stems from businesses seeking cost reduction as op-
posed to customer sales); David L. Wilson, Working the Web: Business Adapting Quickly to
Internet Sales Opportunities, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 17, 1997, at D2 ("World Wide
Web-fueled electronic commerce is currently less about selling goods to consumers ... and
more about the millions of mundane transactions that occur between manufacturers and their
distributors or corporate customers .... [T]he Web... is not so much a tool to make money as
to [sic] save it.").
14 See Shriver, supra note 13, at D1 (citing a survey by Forrester Research and Yankee
Group predicting that the value of goods and services sold on the Internet will grow from
roughly $7-8 billion in 1997 to over $300 billion by 2002).
'5 See U.C.C. § 2-102 (1995) ("Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article applies to
transactions in goods .... ); id. § 2-105(1) (."Goods' means all things (including specially
manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale
other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities (Article 8) and
things in action.").
16 These licenses are commonly known as "shrinkwrap" licenses. The term refers to the
cellophane shrinkwrap that is frequently used to package mass-market software. The terms
printed on the outside of the box usually assert that opening the shrinkwrap will/constitute ac-
ceptance of the contract terms. See Mark A. Lemley, Shrinkwraps in Cyberspace, 35 JU-
RIMETRiCS J. 311, 312 n.5 (1995). As one commentator explains:
In an attempt to discourage unauthorized copying, software publishers typically
include in their shrink-wrap agreements terms which grant end-users only a non-
exclusive, nonassignable, and nontransferable right to operate the program on a
single computer system. Such agreements prohibit any copying of the computer
program for any reason without the written authorization of the software publisher.
[Vol. 49:567
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whether there is a true "sale" bringing the transaction within the scope
of Article 2 of the U.C.C.'
7
Several courts, in a group of decisions commonly referred to as the
"shrinkwrap cases," have had an opportunity to examine the issue of
U.C.C. applicability to computer software programs. These cases are
important to an analysis of service contracts over the Internet because
the nature of the transactions involved in those cases is analogous to
the service transactions that take place over the Internet in that both
involve transfers of information. This series of cases also demon-
strates the difficulty courts encounter when applying the U.C.C. "of-
fer" and "acceptance" provisions to software transactions. 18  More
fundamentally, however, these cases illustrate the much larger prob-
lem of courts misguidedly focusing on abstract issues of U.C.C. ap-
plicability, while ignoring the more important issue of the inherent
deficiencies of U.C.C. Article 2 as applied to computer software and
service transactions. 19
The most recent of these "shrinkwrap cases" is ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg.20 ProCD, a manufacturer of computer software, brought
an action against Zeidenberg after he had downloaded ProCD's cus-
tomized telephone listings and made them available over the Inter-
net.2 ' In response to ProCD's breach of contract claims, the district
court held that the Defendants were not bound by the "shrinkwrap
license" included with the software.22 In arriving at its holding, the
court concluded that the sale of software was a sale of goods gov-
erned by Article 2 of the U.C.C.:
[T]here are sound reasons for treating a software transaction
as a sale of goods under the U.C.C. rather than as a license:
purchasers of mass market software do not make periodic
payments but instead pay a single purchase price, the soft-
ware company does not retain title for the purpose of a secu-
rity interest and no set expiration date exists for the "li-
censed" right.23
David A. Einhorn, Shrink-Wrap Licenses: The Debate Continues, 38 IDEA 383, 385
(1998)
17 See U.C.C. § 2-106 (1995) ("A 'sale' consists in the passing of title from the seller to the
buyer for a price (Section 2-401).'). Under the terms of nearly all licensing agreements, title
remains with the seller, and the buyer merely obtains user rights.
18 See infra Part 11(A) (addressing this conflict in the context of critiquing U.C.C. applica-
bility to Internet service transactions).
'9 See infra Part 1iH(A).
20 908 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
21 See id. at 645.
22 See id. at 655.
2 Id. at 651.
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Accordingly, the court examined the transaction under U.C.C.
sections 2-20724 and 2-209,25 concluding "that because defendants
did not have the opportunity to bargain or object to the proposed user
agreement or even review it before purchase and they did not assent
to the terms explicitly after they learned of them, they are not bound
by the user agreement., 26  The court took notice of a then-current
U.C.C. draft provision, a precursor to Article 2B that would have
made standard form licenses enforceable under certain conditions, as
evidence that the drafters believed the current version of the U.C.C.
did not support enforcement.2 7
The ProCD court's holding that the shrinkwrap license was unen-
forceable was reversed on appeal, with the Seventh Circuit holding
that the shrinkwrap license included with the software was binding on
the buyer.28 Zeidenberg was thus liable for breaching the terms of the
U.C.C. section 2-207 states:
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written
confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance
even though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed
upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional
or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the con-
tract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given
within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is suffi-
cient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not oth-
erwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract consist
of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any sup-
plementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of this Act.
U.C.C. § 2-207 (1995).
2 U.C.C. section 2-209 states:
(1) An agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no consideration
to be binding.
(2) A signed agreement which excludes modification or rescission except by a
signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded, but except as between
merchants such a requirement on a form supplied by the merchant must be sepa-
rately signed by the other party.
(3) The requirements of the statute of frauds section of this Article (Section 2-201)
must be satisfied if the contract as modified is within its provisions.
(4) Although an attempt at modification or rescission does not satisfy the require-
ments of subsection (2) or (3) it can operate as a waiver.
(5) A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory portion of the contract
may retract the waiver by reasonable notification received by the other party that
strict performance will be required of any term waived, unless the retraction would
be unjust in view of a material change of position in reliance on the waiver.
U.C.C. § 2-209 (1995).
26 ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 655.
27 See id. at 655-56.
28 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
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license restricting unauthorized copying and distribution. 29 Never-
theless, the Seventh Circuit agreed that the sale of the software was
governed by the U.C.C.: "[W]e treat the licenses as ordinary contracts
accompanying the sale of products, and therefore as governed by the
common law of contracts and the Uniform Commercial Code.' 30 The
court accordingly conducted a U.C.C. section 2-204(1)31 analysis,
holding that the shrinkwrap license was part of the offer: "A vendor,
as master of the offer, may invite acceptance by conduct, and may
propose limitations on the kind of conduct that constitutes acceptance.
A buyer may accept by performing the acts the vendor proposes to
treat as acceptance. And that is what happened.,
32
While the ProCD decisions at least superficially confronted the is-
sue of whether software is truly a "good" and thus within the scope of
the U.C.C., the Third Circuit, in Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v.
Wyse Technology,33 simply assumed this fact. Step-Saver Data Sys-
tems ("Step-Saver") developed and marketed a multi-user computer
network system, or client-server architecture, which utilized a pro-
gram by The Software Link, Inc. ("TSL") as its operating system.34
Step-Saver sold 142 systems in five months and immediately began
receiving customer complaints; eventually, several of these customers
brought suit against Step-Saver.35  In turn, Step-Saver brought suit
against Wyse, as well as TSL, for legal costs incurred in defending
these lawsuits. 36 Upon dismissal of its original claim, Step-Saver then
brought a second complaint alleging breach of warranties by TSL and
Wyse and intentional misrepresentations by TSL.37 At trial, the dis-
trict court directed a verdict for TSL, holding that the shrinkwrap li-
cense of TSL's software was the complete and exclusive agreement
between Step-Saver and TSL under U.C.C. section 2-202.38 Further-
29 See id. at 1452.
30 Id. at 1450.
31 U.C.C. section 2-204(1) states: "A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner
sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence
of such a contract." U.C.C § 2-204(1) (1995).3 2 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452.
33 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991).
34 See id. at 94.
35 See id.
36 see id.
37 See id.
38 U.C.C. section 2-202 states:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or
which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expres-
sion of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may not
be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral
agreement but may be explained or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or by course of
performance (Section 2-208); and
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more, the court held that under U.C.C. section 2-316, the license
agreement effectively disclaimed all express and implied warranties
otherwise made by TSL.4°
The Third Circuit, under a U.C.C. sections 2-204(3) 41 and 2-
207(3)42 analysis, held that the contract was sufficiently definite with-
out the boxtop license terms because the telephone orders specified
the goods involved, the quantity and the price.43 Thus, the court
chose to view the contract as formed by the conduct of both parties
rather than analyzing the formation in terms of "offeree" and "of-
feror." The court further held that the boxtop licenses, in the alterna-
tive, did not operate as a conditional acceptance because TSL did not
clearly express its unwillingness to proceed with the transaction un-
less its additional terms were incorporated into the parties' agree-
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the
writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement
of the terms of the agreement.
U.C.C. § 2-202 (1995).39 U.C.C. section 2-316 states:
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words or
conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever reason-
able as consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of this Article on
parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202) negation or limitation is inoperative to
the extent that such construction is unreasonable.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of mer-
chantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in
case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied war-
ranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to
exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that
'There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof.'
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are
excluded by expressions like 'as is', 'with all faults' or other language
which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclu-
sion of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty; and
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the goods
or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to examine
the goods there is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an
examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him; and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by course of deal-
ing or course of performance or usage of trade.
(4) Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance with the provi-
sions of this Article on liquidation or limitation of damages and on contractual
modification of remedy (Sections 2-718 and 2-719).
U.C.C. § 2-316 (1995).
40 See Step-Saver Data Sys., 939 F.2d at 94-95.
41 U.C.C. section 2-204(3) states: "Even though one or more terms are left open a contract
for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there
is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy." U.C.C. § 2-204(3).
42 See supra note 24.
43 See Step-Saver Data Sys., 939 F.2d at 100.
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ment.44 The court rejected TSL's argument that the repeated expres-
sion of the terms via the boxtop licenses incorporated them into the
contract: "Wle hold that the actions of TSL in repeatedly sending a
writing, whose terms would otherwise be excluded under U.C.C § 2-
207, cannot establish a course of conduct between TSL and Step-
Saver that adopted the terms of the writing." 45
The Third Circuit consequently reversed the trial court holding
that the parties intended to adopt the boxtop license as the complete
and final expression of the terms of their agreement under U.C.C.
section 2-20246 and held instead that the boxtop license should have
been treated as a U.C.C. section 2-207(2)47 written confirmation con-
taining additional terms.48 In addition, the court went on to hold that
if the district court found that the parties' contract included express
warranties made by TSL, then as a matter of law, the disclaimer of
warranty and limitation of remedies provisions on the boxtop license
would materially alter the terms of the contract under U.C.C. section
2-207(2)(b) 49 and would not become part of the contract.50 Thus, TSL
would be bound by any express warranties made to Step-Saver.
In a case involving the same party (TSL) and the same software,
Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. v. Software Link, Inc.,5t the district court
again assumed U.C.C. applicability. Arizona Retail Systems ("ARS")
developed and marketed multi-user computer systems and became
interested in TSL's PC-MOS operating system. 52 ARS's system
manager ordered a live copy of PC-MOS that, along with an evalua-
tive copy, arrived with a shrinkwrap license containing several mate-
rial clauses. The system manager decided to keep the system and
purchased additional copies of PC-MOS over the next year.54  To
44 See id. at 103. Thus, the box-top license did not meet the requirements of a conditional
acceptance under U.C.C. section 2-207(1). See id. while a conditional acceptance analysis
seems counterintuitive to a performance-created contract analysis, the Step-Saver court inter-
preted the comments to U.C.C. section 2-207(1) as validating such an analysis: "The official
comment to U.C.C. 2-207 suggests that, even though a proposed deal has been closed, the con-
ditional acceptance analysis still applies in determining which writing's terms will define the
contract." Id. at 101 n.29.451 Id. at 104.
46 See supra note 38.
47 See supra note 24.
48 See Step-Saver Data Sys., 939 F.2d at 105.
49 See supra note 24.
50 See Step-Saver Data Sys., 939 F.2d at 105.
51 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993).52 See id. at 760.
s3 See id. at 761 (summarizing six relevant clauses including non-transfer, disclaimer of
warranties, limitation of remedies, integration, and prohibition of assignment provisions as well
as a provision that states the purchaser accepts the terms of the license upon opening the pack-
age) See id.
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place an order, ARS called TSL and agreed on the specific goods to
be shipped, their quantity and their price.55  TSL then shipped the
goods with a shrinkwrap license affixed to each set of software.56
Unfortunately, ARS's customers soon reported serious problems with
the operating systemI
57
Eventually, ARS brought suit against TSL, moving for partial
summary judgment on the issue of whether TSL had effectively dis-
claimed implied warranties and alleged oral representations through
the shrinkwrap licenses. 58 The court employed a U.C.C. section 2-
20759 analysis to separate the transaction into two categories: the first
contract involving the live copy and the subsequent purchases. 6° The
court held that for the first transaction, "the contract was not formed
when TSL shipped the goods but rather only after ARS opened the
shrinkwrap on the live version of PC-MOS which ARS had notice
would result in a contract being formed.",61 Thus, TSL was the of-
feror and ARS was the offeree.
The court then examined the subsequent purchases, holding that
under U.C.C. section 2-209,62 the license agreements constituted pro-
posals for modification that required express assent, which ARS did
not provide. 63 In reaching this holding, the court shifted its interpre-
tation of the contract formation in the initial purchase by finding that
for the subsequent purchases, ARS was the offeror and TSL was the
offeree as ARS's telephone order established quantity and price and
TSL accepted by shipping the goods to ARS.64 The court concluded
that TSL entered into a contract when it agreed to ship the goods to
ARS and thus TSL could not treat the license agreement as a condi-
tional acceptance. 65 The court rounded out its holding by offering
" See id.
56 See id.
-7 See id.
58 See Arizona Retail Sys., 831 F. Supp. at 760.
59 See supra note 24.
60 See Arizona Retail Sys., 831 F. Supp. at 763-64.
61 Id. at 763. The court chose to view the shipment as the offer because what ARS origi-
nally ordered was an evaluation diskette. TSL included with this diskette a live copy of the PC-
MOS program contained in a sealed envelope, the outside of which purported to bind the user to
the license agreement upon the opening of the envelope. See id. at 764.62 See supra note 25.
63 See Arizona Retail Sys., 831 F. Supp. at 764. The license agreement was thus a proposed
modification to an established, albeit simple, agreement as to the specific goods to be shipped
and the quantity and price of those goods. See id.
6 See id. at 764-65.
65 See id. at 765.
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public policy support for its ruling and granted partial summary
judgment to ARS for the subsequent purchases.67
Although the foregoing cases have all analyzed the sale of soft-
ware in a U.C.C. contract formation framework, the recent federal
district court opinion in Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Center, Inc.
68
demonstrates why such a framework can be considered fundamentally
at odds with the sale of software. In Novell, the court held the U.C.C.
applied to the sale of software from Novell to Network Trade Center,
and that under the first sale doctrine, Network Trade Center was an
"owner" by way of sale and, consequently, entitled to the same rights
as owners of any other type of goods.69 The shrinkwrap license was
thus invalid since by its terms, title to the software was retained by
Novell.7°
3. Mixed Transactions
While the courts in the shrinkwrap cases had no difficulty in as-
serting U.C.C. jurisdiction over the software involved in those cases,
other courts have conducted a more rigorous examination of com-
puter-related products typically involving a mixture of goods and
services. In these cases, courts confronted the issue of whether the
nature of the transaction involving both services and goods warranted
U.C.C. or common law treatment. The most recent case involving
this type of analysis is Micro Data Base Systems, Inc. v. Dharma
Systems, Inc.71 In Micro Data Base Systems, the buyer, Micro Data
Base Systems ("MDBS"), entered into a contract with the seller,
Dharma Systems ("Dharma"), whereby Dharma agreed to adapt its
SQL Access software program for use in MDBS's workstation data-
base management system in consideration for a license fee of
$125,000 and a professional service fee of $125,000.72 The relation-
ship deteriorated, however, when Dharma refused to correct some
minor errors in the software until MDBS actually signed the license
agreement.73
66 See i. at 766 ("[To accept TSL's argument would allow TSL and other sellers to take
advantage of the fact that purchasers often invest considerable time and money before ordering
goods, and, therefore, are somewhat less likely to return goods once they arrive .... Requiring
the seller to discuss terms it considers essential before the seller ships the goods is not unfair.").
67 See Ud at 765-66.
625 F. Supp.2d 1218 (D. Utah 1997).
69 See id. at 1230.70 See id.
71 148 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 1998).72 See id. at 651.
73See id.
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Judge Posner, writing for the majority, first identified the transac-
tion as a sale of a good (the softwareprogram) and a service (the pro-
gramming of the software program). New Hampshire case law re-
quires that the U.C.C. apply to such transactions when the sale of
goods predominates the transaction. 75 The Seventh Circuit held that
in this transaction, despite the fact that half of the total consideration
was in the form of a professional service fee, the sale of the goods
predominated. 76 Judge Posner's reasoning for this holding was sim-
ple, yet convincing:
Although the contract recites that half the total contract price
is for Dharma's "professional services," these were not serv-
ices to be rendered to MDBS but merely the labor to be ex-
pended by Dharma in the "manufacture" of the good from
existing software. It's no different than if MDBS were buy-
ing an automobile from Dharma, and Dharma invoiced
MDBS $20,000 for the car and $1000 for labor involved in
customizing it for MDBS's special needs. It would still be the
sale of a good within the meaning of the U.C.C. We doubt
that it should even be called a "hybrid" sale, for this would
imply that every sale of goods is actually a hybrid sale, since
labor is a service and labor is an input into the manufacture of
every good.77
This economic analysis cuts to the center of the nature of the transac-
tion itself and only removes the services from the U.C.C. framework
if the services are independent of the creation of the goods them-
selves.
Similar to the predomination test is the purpose test in NMP Corp.
v. Parametric Technology Corp.78 NMP, a switchboard manufactur-
ing firm, was granted a license from Parametric to use its Pro/E engi-
neering software, which NMP wanted to utilize on its assemblies.79
The Pro/E software, however, did not work with large assemblies and
NMP brought suit after Parametric refused to refund the monies spent
to purchase and install the software.8 0 In deciding whether the con-
tractual statute of limitations in the Licensing Agreement rendered
NMP's breach of contract claim moot, the court found that the soft-
ware license was a sale of goods under the U.C.C.:
74 See id. at 654.
7s See id. at 654-55 (citations omitted).76 See id. at 655.
77 id.
71 958 F. Supp. 1536 (N.D. Okla. 1997).
79 See id. at 1539.
'0 See id. at 1539-40.
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This Court adopts the reasoning of the New Hampshire dis-
trict court in Colonial Life Ins. Co. v. Electronic Data Sys.
Corp. [citation omitted], and holds that the licensing agree-
ment at issue in this case constitutes a sale of goods under the
Oklahoma Uniform Commercial Code. Although the Li-
censing Agreement contemplated that Parametric would pro-
vide services to NMP, the purpose and main thrust of the
agreement was to support implementation of the Pro/E soft-
ware at N.P"
Hence, the contractual statute of limitations was valid and NMP's
breach of contract claim failed.
Colonial Life Insurance Co. v. Electronic Data Systems Corp.2
offers a test similar to the NMP purpose and main thrust test. Colo-
nial Life Insurance Company ("Colonial") and Electronic Data Sys-
tems Corporation ("EDS") entered into a license agreement under
which EDS licensed software to Colonial and agreed to provide cer-
tain data processing services in consideration of $21,300,450.83 The
license agreement contained limitation of damages and limitation of
warranties provisions. 84 Each party apparently had difficulty meeting
its contractual obligations and, as of the date of the action, Colonial
had paid EDS over eleven million dollars but had yet to receive the
software.8 5 EDS moved for summary judgment on the breach of con-
tract action and the inquiry initially focused on whether the transac-
tion was a sale of goods and hence subject to the U.C.C. The court
first found that the transaction involved a mix of goods and services:86
"'A contract for computer data processing services is neither a con-
tract purely for personal services nor a contract for the sale of goods.
It is an enterprise that involves a combination of personal skills and
labor, materials, equipment and time. ' '8 7 In deciding whether this
mixed transaction was included under Article 2 of the U.C.C., the
court used the test enunciated in Bonebrake v. Cox,88 "whether their
predominant factor, their thrust, their purpose, reasonably stated...
is a transaction of sale."89 The court examined the license agreement
81 Id. at 1542 (emphasis added).
82 817 F. Supp. 235 (D.N.H. 1993).
3 See id. at 237.
' See id.
'
5 See id. at 238.
86 See id.
87 Id. (quoting Kearsarge Computer, Inc. v. Acme Staple Co., 366 A.2d 467, 471 (N.H.
1976)).
88499 F.2d 951,960 (8th Cir. 1974).
89 Colonial Life Ins., 817 F. Supp. at 239 (emphasis added).
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and found that "It]he essence of the contract was to license Chubb to
use a computer software product."
90
Although each of the above cases was decided in favor of U.C.C.
applicability, there is one decision involving computer services and
software in which the court decided that the services were the domi-
nant motive of the contract. In Data Processing Services, Inc. v. L.H.
Smith Oil Corp.,91 Data Processing Services, Inc. ("DPS") and L.H.
Smith Oil Corporation ("Smith") entered into an oral agreement under
which DPS agreed to develop computer software for an accounting
application on Smith's mainframe. 92 Smith eventually stopped pay-
ments on its bills to DPS who, as a result, brought suit against Smith
alleging breach of contract and open account. 93 Smith won a bench
verdict at trial and DPS appealed, arguing the trial court erred in
holding that the contract was subject to the Article 2 provisions of the
U.C.C.94 The court used an inclusio unius est exclusio alterius (the
inclusion of one is the exclusion of all others) principle of construc-
tion in determining whether the mixed sale of goods and services was
subject to the U.C.C.95 Under this test, the court found clearly erro-
neous the lower court's holding that DPS sold goods to Smith.96 The
court found the transaction to be a service contract after examining
the relationship between the parties:
DPS sold no "hardware" to Smith. Instead DPS was retained
to design, develop, and implement an electronic data proc-
essing system to meet Smith's specific needs .... Although
the end result was to be preserved by means of some physical
manifestation such as magnetic tape, floppy or hard disks,
etc., ... it was DPS's knowledge, skill, and ability for which
Smith bargained. The sale of computer hardware or gener-
ally-available standardized software was not here involved.
97
Consequently, the U.C.C. implied warranty of merchantability did
not apply.98
90 Id.
9' 492 N.E.2d 314 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).92 See id. at 316.
9' See id.94 See id. at 316, 318.
95 See id. at 318.
96 See id. at 319.
9 7 Id. at 318-19.
98 U.C.C. section 2-314(1) states:
Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with re-
spect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value of food or drink
to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
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Taken together, the shrinkwrap cases and the decisions in NMP
Corp., Colonial Life Insurance Co., and Data Processing Services
highlight the advantages of using a uniform commercial statute as a
rule regime. However, these decisions also demonstrate the draw-
backs of applying a commercial code designed for sales of goods to
information-related transactions. These problems are clearly apparent
in contract formation analysis. For example, the courts in each of the
decisions confronted the uneasy proposition of deciding whether to
frame the transaction as having been formed by traditional offer and
acceptance or as formed by the conduct of the parties. Each possibil-
ity entails materially different results for both vendors and consumers.
While the shrinkwrap cases do not offer much assistance in deter-
mining why software transactions should be governed by the U.C.C.,
they do demonstrate the willingness of the courts to use the U.C.C. in
these borderline situations and help explain why such contracts are
written to conform to the U.C.C. However, it is the mixed transaction
cases that offer the more rational analysis of the issue of service
transactions over the Internet. Their common test of determining
whether the predominant purpose and main thrust of the transaction
involves goods or services in deciding U.C.C. applicability confronts
the mixed nature of Internet transactions directly. Nevertheless, given
the difficulty in applying such an analysis to the ever increasing num-
ber of transactions over the Internet, a rule regime such as that em-
bodied in Article 2B deserves careful consideration.
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Inadequacy of Current U. C. C. Provisions
1. Arguments for U. C.C. Inapplicability and the Easterbrook
Analysis
The shrinkwrap cases illustrate a number of relevant issues in-
volved with both software available on the Internet and Internet serv-
ice contracts. The district court's analysis in ProCD v. Zeidenberg
regarding the applicability of the U.C.C. to the telephone listing soft-
ware raises several critical distinctions that deserve attention. The
court was careful to limit the reach of the U.C.C. to "mass market
software." 99 Mass market software can rationally be classified as a
good under U.C.C. section 2-405(1) 1°° as products movable and iden-
tifiable at the time of sale, because they are standardized physical
U.C.C. § 2-314 (1) (1995).
99 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640,651 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
1o0 See supra note 15.
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objects in the form of diskettes. This may well be the reason why the
courts in Step-Saver and Arizona Retail Systems simply assumed that
the mass-market operating systems were goods subject to the provi-
sions of the U.C.C.
However, while the software in all three of these cases existed in
physical form as diskettes, the software available to users worldwide
over the Internet is not in any physical form other than the millions of
bytes being transferred by telephone wire to the hard drives of the end
users. While this stream of data is certainly movable, it does not ex-
ist in any identifiable form until it is stored in a file on a hard drive or
diskette.
This issue can be explored in a more practical manner using a hy-
pothetical involving a Web design service that contracts with a cus-
tomer over the Internet to design a Web page for that customer.
When the Web page is completed and published on the Web, serious
design flaws are discovered and the customer brings suit, claiming
breach of an implied warranty of fitness and merchantability. In such
a situation, categorizing the Web page as a good subject to the provi-
sions of the U.C.C. would stretch too far the concept of a good for
several reasons. First, the customer never really took possession of
the Web page as it was never delivered to the customer, but was
merely published on the World Wide Web. Second, the main thrust
of the transaction is clearly a service, that of designing and imple-
menting a Web page to the specifications of a customer. 0 1
The district and appellate court decisions in ProCD v. Zeidenberg
also illustrate the difficulties in applying a U.C.C. analysis to transac-
tions involving services or mixed bundles of goods and services.
Under the U.C.C., there will often be a conflict between the additional
terms provisions in section 2-207102 that the district court in ProCD
relied on and the assent by conduct provision in section 2-20413 that
the Seventh Circuit used as the basis for its reversal of the district
court. The result is that Web-based businesses are often unsure how
to structure their contracts and effectively bind their customer to the
terms therein.
Adding to the confusion is the effect of Judge Easterbrook's
opinion in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,1°4 an opinion that contains a
101 This hypothetical recalls the same reasoning used in Data Processing Services, because
the Web design company was providing its "knowledge, skill, and ability" rather than any iden-
tifiable good. See Data Processing Serv., Inc. v. L.H. Smith Oil Corp., 492 N.E.2d 314, 319
(Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
102 See supra note 24.
103 See supra note 31.
'04 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 47 (1997).
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tenuous U.C.C. analysis when applied to the facts of the case and to
public policy in general. In Hill, a case involving a customer who
purchased a computer over the telephone and who later sued Gateway
2000 ("Gateway"), Judge Easterbrook held that the terms enclosed in
the box with the computer, including a mandatory arbitration 'clause,
were enforceable against the buyer.105 Judge Easterbrook in effect
concluded that Gateway's shipment of the computer was the offer and
the buyer's retention of the product past the thirty days stated in
Gateway's terms constituted an acceptance."' In reaching this hold-
ing, Judge Easterbrook relied on the contract formation analysis in the
Seventh Circuit decision in ProCD as support for his analysis.'
7
The Easterbrook analysis, however, seems to ignore the basic
facts of Hill as well as the provisions of the U.C.C. The Hills or-
dered their computer system after seeing an ad in a computer
magazine. 10 8 The Hill's action in ordering the system by calling the
toll-free number and giving their credit card number meets the ba-
sic qualification of an offer under section 2-206(1)(b).'t° Gateway
accepted the oral offer when it shipped the computer to the Hills
and the terms included with the computer would be considered as a
written confirmation with additional terms under section 2-
207(1).1l ° Since the Hills do not fall under the U.C.C. definition of
'0' See hi. at 1150.
106 See hi. ("By keeping the computer beyond 30 days, the Hills accepted Gateway's offer,
including the arbitration clause."). This reasoning was followed in a recent case, again with
Gateway 2000 as Defendant, involving the validity of the mandatory arbitration clause. See
Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569,572 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) ("[W]e agree with
... [the Hill v. Gateway 2000] rationale that, in such transactions, there is no agreement or
contract upon the placement of the order or even upon the receipt of the goods. By the terms of
the Agreement at issue, it is only after the consumer has affirmatively retained the merchandise
for more than 30 days-within which the consumer has presumably examined and even used the
product(s) and read the agreement-that the contract has been effectuated.").
"7 See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148-49.
'03 See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., No. 96 C 4086, 1996 WL 650631, at *1 (N.D. M11. Nov.
7, 1991).
109 U.C.C. section 2-206(1)(b) states: "[Ain order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or
current shipment shall be construed as inviting acceptance either by a prompt promise to ship or
by the prompt or current shipment of conforming or nonconforming goods .... " U.C.C. § 2-
206(1) (1995).
110 See supra note 24. This fact pattern is specifically referred to in Comment 1 of
U.C.C. section 2-207, which states:
This section is intended to deal with two typical situations. The one is the written
confirmation, where an agreement has been reached either orally or by informal cor-
respondence between the parties and is followed by one or both of the parties send-
ing formal memoranda embodying the terms so far as agreed upon and adding terms
not discussed.
U.C.C. § 2-207, Comment 1 (1995).
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merchants in section 2-104(1),"' then under section 2-207(2)112 the
additional terms should have been discarded.
11 3
2. Public Policy Concerns
In addition to the problems with Judge Easterbrook's U.C.C.
analysis, there are also several public policy arguments contravening
his interpretation of contract formation. First, Judge Easterbrook's
interpretation of section 2-207 is contrary to the principle of neutrality
between parties, a principle that is the foundation of many of the pro-
visions in the U.C.C.11 4 If contracts under the U.C.C. are formed us-
ing Judge Easterbrook's framework, the seller can simply bypass sec-
tion 2-207(2)115 by relying on the vendor-as-"master of the offer" lan-
guage in ProCD which justified the contract formation analysis of the
shipment as the offer.11 6 Thus, the vendor can establish the terms of
the contract after receiving an order and payment.
Second, such an analysis places an enormous burden on the con-
sumer who must then undergo significant expense and effort to reject
an offer. The Hill case is a typical example of this burden. In order
for the Hills to reject the offer, Easterbrook would have them disas-
semble the computer system, package the components, and ship it
back to Gateway. While this might not seem unjust if the Hills were
revoking their acceptance, this laborious effort is not warranted for a
simple rejection of an offer.
Third, such an interpretation of contract formation creates a con-
siderable potential for abuse by vendors who may be motivated by
consumers' unwillingness to undergo such expense and labor in order
to return goods. With knowledge of this reluctance, merchants will be
tempted to ship non-conforming goods, or perhaps even goods that
were never ordered at all, to consumers with the assurance that simple
11 U.C.C. section 2-104(1) states:
"Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occu-
pation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or
goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attrib-
uted by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his oc-
cupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
U.C.C. § 2-104 (1) (1995).
12 See supra note 24.
113 While the contract itself would still be intact, the Hills would retain their statutory rights
of action against Gateway and would not be subject to mandatory arbitration.
14 See Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 766 (D. Ariz.
1993) ("Section 2-207 was drafted to ensure neutrality between contracting parties-i.e., to
ensure that a party, usually the selling party, does not gain an advantage merely by being the last
one to send a form.").
1 See supra note 24.
116 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996).
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retention by the consumer will constitute an acceptance of the seller's
goods and terms of sale. This can lead to adhesion contracts or un-
conscionable contract terms, a problem that has already manifested
itself in case law.117 Thus, the result reached in Gateway is a detour
from traditional U.C.C. analysis, contrary to public policy and will
only add more confusion to the issue of offer and acceptance as ap-
plied to contracts on the Internet.
One solution to this dilemma is to structure the transaction in
such a way as to require the buyer to assent to the terms of the
contract through a series of prompts which must be completed be-
fore acceptance of the service.118 However, businesses risk losing
revenue by discouraging potential customers who must progress
through several screens of legal terms before placing an actual or-
der for services.
3. U.C.C. Damages
The issue of damages is another issue that the U.C.C. fails to ac-
count for appropriately when applied to service transactions over the
Internet. The U.C.C. damages provisions, sections 2-703,119 2-708,120
117 In the Brower v. Gateway 2000 case discussed supra note 106, the court found the man-
datory arbitration clause, which required Brower to arbitrate under the auspices of the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce (ICC), to be unconscionable due to the excessive cost and incon-
venience that it entailed. See Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 574 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1998). To arbitrate a claim less than $50,000 under the ICC's Rule of Conciliation and
Arbitration required advance fees of $4000, of which $2000 was nonrefundable. See id. at 571.
These costs exceed the prices of most of Gateway 2000's product line. See id.
118 This practice is commonly referred to as a "clickwrap" license so named because the
window requiring a mouse click to proceed is similar to the removal of the cellophane shrink-
wrap on mass-market software. See Greguras et. al., supra note 3, at 19. By constructing the
transaction in such a way as to force the customer to accept the terms of the contract before
offering the acceptance, the vendor can effectively bypass U.C.C. section 2-207(1) by activating
the exception in section 2-207(2)(a). See supra note 24 ("The additional terms are to be con-
strued as proposals for addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of
the contract unless ... the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer."). This
insures that enforcement of the contract will be the same either under the common law's "mirror
image" rule or under the U.C.C.
"
9 U.C.C. section 2-703 states:
Where the buyer wrongfully rejects or revokes acceptance of goods or fails to make
a payment due on or before delivery or repudiates with respect to a part or the whole,
then with respect to any goods directly affected and, if the breach is of the whole
contract (Section 2-612), then also with respect to the whole undelivered balance, the
aggrieved seller may
(a) withhold delivery of such goods;
(b) stop delivery by any bailee as hereafter provided (Section 2-705);
(c) proceed under the next section respecting goods still unidentified to the
contract;
(d) resell and recover damages as hereafter provided (Section 2-706);
(e) recover damages for non-acceptance (Section 2-708) or in a proper case the
price (Section 2-709);
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2-711121 and 2-714,122 are designed specifically for goods and conse-
quently prove inadequate when applied to the service transactions
typically taking place over the Internet.
One example that illustrates this insufficiency is that of an infor-
mation database that distributes confidential information. If an end-
(f) cancel.
U.C.C. § 2-703 (1995).
,20U.C.C. section 2-708 states:
(I) Subject to subsection (2) and to the provisions of this Article with respect to
proof of market price (Section 2-723), the measure of damages for non-acceptance or
repudiation by the buyer is the difference between the market price at the time and
place for tender and the unpaid contract price together with any incidental damages
provided in this Article (Section 2-710), but less expenses saved in consequence of
the buyer's breach.
(2) If the measure of damages provided in subsection (1) is inadequate to put the
seller in as good a position as performance would have done then the measure of
damages is the profit (including reasonable overhead) which the seller would have
made from full performance by the buyer, together with any incidental damages pro-
vided in this Article (Section 2-710), due allowance for costs reasonably incurred
and due credit for payments or proceeds of resale.
U.C.C. § 2-708 (1995).
121 U.C.C. section 2-711 states:
(1) Where the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or the buyer right fully re-
jects or justifiably revokes acceptance then with respect to any goods involved, and
with respect to the whole if the breach goes to the whole contract (Section 2-612),
the buyer may cancel and whether or not he has done so may in addition to recover-
ing so much of the price as has been paid
(a) "cover" and have damages under the next section as to all the goods af-
fected whether or not they have been identified to the contract; or
(b) recover damages for non-delivery as provided in this Article (Section 2-
713).
(2) Where the seller fails to deliver or repudiates the buyer may also
(a) if the goods have been identified recover them as provided in this Article
(Section 2-502); or
(b) in a proper case obtain specific performance or replevy the goods as pro-
vided in this Article (Section 2-716).
(3) On rightful rejection or justifiable revocation of acceptance a buyer has a security
interest in goods in his possession or control for any payments made on their price
and any expenses reasonably incurred in their inspection, receipt, transportation, care
and custody and may hold such goods and resell them in like manner as an aggrieved
seller (Section 2-706).
U.C.C. § 2-711 (1995).
122 U.C.C. section 2-714 states:
(1) Where the buyer has accepted goods and given notification (subsection (3) of
Section 2-607) he may recover as damages for any non-conformity of tender the loss
resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach as determined in
any manner which is reasonable.
(2) The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time and
place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they
would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show
proximate damages of a different amount.
(3) In a proper case any incidental and consequential damages under the next section
may also be recovered.
U.C.C. § 2-714 (1995).
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user downloads this information or orders a hard copy on software
through the Internet and then wrongfully repudiates the information,
the aggrieved seller would find it very difficult to recover appropriate
damages under the U.C.C. for several reasons. First, U.C.C. section
2-708 provides that the measure of damages for repudiation by the
buyer is the difference between the market price and the unpaid con-
tract price plus incidental damages and less expenses saved.123 The
difficulties in implementation of this provision to the example be-
come apparent: information is an intangible good that is usually de-
livered to the buyer as a customized product, conforming to the
buyer's particular specifications. It is thus very difficult to establish a
market price in such a situation.
A second difficulty is that although the U.C.C. does allow conse-
quential damages for buyers under sections 2-713l2 4 and 2-715,l2 it
does not allow for the satisfaction of the expectation interests of sell-
ers. Consider, for instance, a hypothetical involving a software de-
signer who agrees to sell to an lnternet travel services site a vacation
planning program in consideration for $10,000 plus royalties of 10%
for each version of the program downloaded from the Internet by
customers. The travel services company later repudiates the contract
and the designer is unable to find another buyer for his program.
While the designer would be able to recover the $10,000 under
U.C.C. § 2-709(l)' 26 in an action on the breach, the remedies avail-
123 See supra note 120.
124 U.C.C. section 2-713 states:
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Article with respect to proof of market price
(Section 2-723), the measure of damages for non-delivery or repudiation by the seller
is the difference between the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the
breach and the contract price together with any incidental and consequential damages
provided in this Article (Section 2-715), but less expenses saved in consequence of
the seller's breach.
(2) Market price is to be determined as of the place for tender or, in cases of rejection
after arrival or revocation of acceptance, as of the place of arrival.
U.C.C. § 2-713 (1995).
125 U.C.C. section 2-715 states:
(1) Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach include expenses reasonably
incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody of goods right-
fully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in
connection with effecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident to the
delay or other breach.
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of
which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could
not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of war-
ranty.
U.C.C. § 2-715 (1995).
12 U.C.C. section 2-709(1) states:
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able under Section 2-703127 to the seller would not include the present
value of the royalties the designer would have received had the con-
tract not been repudiated. This would not be the result under the
common law as the satisfaction of a party's expectation interest is
provided to both buyers and sellers.128
In addition to this type of consequential damages, the U.C.C. dam-
age provisions also do not account for the damages that may result
from misuse of the information, which can frequently erode the pro-
prietary interest of the seller. While U.C.C. section 2-714 provides
for damages to the buyer in case of breach in regard to accepted
goods, 129 there is no equivalent provision for the seller in the list of
remedies available to it under U.C.C. section 2-703.13o While this
may seem to be a peculiar result, the explanation becomes clear when
one considers that a seller would have no need for such a remedy after
delivering goods (in the restricted sense of the term, which excludes
transfers of information) to the buyer.
Consider the situation of ProCD in bringing its action against
Matthew Zeidenberg. ProCD had spent over ten million dollars to
compile and maintain its database of telephone numbers and ad-
dresses, charging consumers $150 to purchase the five compact discs
containing the database. 131 Zeidenberg made this database available
on the Internet to anyone willing to pay him a much lower price; in
fact, there were up to 20,000 such purchases a day. 132 ProCD conse-
quently suffered significantly from the misappropriation of its data-
base but would be left unsatisfied under U.C.C. section 2-703133 since
(1) When the buyer fails to pay the price as it becomes due the seller may recover,
together with any incidental damages under the next section, the price
(a) of goods accepted or of conforming goods lost or damaged within a com-
mercially reasonable time after risk of their loss has passed to the buyer; and
(b) of goods identified to the contract if the seller is unable after reason-
able effort to resell them at a reasonable price or the circumstances rea-
sonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing.
U.C.C. § 2-709 (1) (1995).
127 See supra note 119.
128 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS section 347 states:
Subject to the limitation stated in §§ 350-53, the injured party has a right to damages
based on his expectation interest as measured by
(a) the loss in the value to him of the other party's performance caused by its
failure or deficiency, plus
(b) any other loss, including incidental or consequential loss, caused by the
breach, less
(c) any cost or other loss that he has avoided by not having to perform.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981).
129 See supra note 122.
130 See supra note 119.
131 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996).
132 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 645-46 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
133 See supra note 119.
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the goods were already delivered and paid for by Zeidenberg. ProCD
would be relegated to pursuing its claims for consequential damages
under the Federal Copyright Act.134
4. U.C.C. Statute of Frauds
Finally, the U.C.C.'s statute of frauds provision in section 2-
201135 also presents difficulties for Internet transactions since the
record of the transaction exists electronically and not in the form
of a writing. 136  Further difficulties are encountered with the re-
quirement of a signature in U.C.C. sections 2-201(1) 117 and 2-
209(2)138 as written signatures do not exist in such transactions,
except in digital form in limited circumstances.
134 Under the Federal Copyright Act, a copyright owner can recover the profits of the in-
fringer that result from the copyright infringement. See Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(b)
(West 1997) ("The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages suffered by him or
her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the
infringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages.").
135 U.C.C. section 2-201 states:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods for
the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there
is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between
the parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his
authorized agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient because it omits or incor-
rectly states a term agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable under this para-
graph beyond the quantity of goods shown in such writing.
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the
contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiving it has
reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of subsection (1) against
such party unless written notice of objection to its contents is given within 10 days
after it is received.
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (1) but which is
valid in other respects is enforceable
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer and are not suit-
able for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's business and the
seller, before notice of repudiation is received and under circumstances
which reasonably indicate that the goods are for the buyer, has made either
a substantial beginning of their manufacture or commitments for their pro-
curement; or
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading, tes-
timony or otherwise in court that a contract for sale was made, but the con-
tract is not enforceable under this provision beyond the quantity of goods
admitted; or
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has been made and accepted or
which have been received and accepted (Sec. 2-606).
U.C.C. § 2-201 (1995).
136 The applicability of the statute of frauds to transactions conducted over the Internet has
drawn the attention of commentators. See generally Richard Allan Homing, Has Hal Signed a
Contract?: The Statute of Frauds in Cyberspace, 12 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
LJ. 253 (1996) (maintaining that the traditional concepts of "writing" and "signed" can be
adapted to modern technology without major revisions to the statute of frauds).
13 7 See supra note 135.
138 See supra note 25.
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B. The Inadequacy of Common Law Contracts Rules
Since many sites on the Internet require the end-user to navigate
through a series of prompts that establish the terms of the contract or
license before executing the transaction, the common law mirror im-
age rule would seem an ideal fit for such transactions. Since these
transactions do not generally involve the "battle of forms" accounted
for in the U.C.C. offer and acceptance provisions, the common law
requirement that the acceptance strictly conform to the terms of the
offer in order to constitute an acceptance rather than a counter-offer
appears on its face to be the commercially practical rule regime.
While the common law rule regime is doubtlessly more effective
in simple arms-length transactions such as airline reservations, its
utility is questionable when the transaction takes place as a part of a
continuing customer-vendor relationship. In these circumstances,
where both parties have significant bargaining power and a certain
degree of legal sophistication, both parties will presumably attempt to
attach their specific terms to the agreement.
Today it is not uncommon for large businesses to have established
Intranets 139 that allow them to order goods and services from suppli-
ers. 14° In such a relationship, the parties can either agree to the terms
of the contract up front or participate in the same battle of the forms
that takes place through the mail and facsimile lines. The rigidity of
the mirror image rule would be a deterrent to both parties since the
inconsistent forms could negate the contract or lead to the arbitrary
result of rewarding whichever party sent the last form. If the com-
mercial possibility of Internet technology is to be fully realized, it
must exist within a rule regime that has the flexibility to promote
139 Intranets are essentially smaller and more secure versions of the Internet based on the
same technology. As defined by one commentator:
In essence, it is any site based upon Internet technology that is placed upon private
servers (computers) within an organization. The main difference between the Internet
and intranets is the fact that, in the case of the former, organizations presenting in-
formation invite outsiders to access that information, whereas an intranet is designed
not to let any outsiders in. From the user's point of view, intranets look like the Inter-
net; both use the same technology and both ixe accessed by the user via 'browser'
technology (the two most popular browsers being Microsoft Explorer and Netscape
Navigator). One could say an intranet is a private version of the Internet.
Nigel Armitage, Intranets: Web's Offspring May Offer Greater Benefits, 3 No. 11 LAW FIRM
PARTNERSHIP & BEN. REP. 1, 1 (1997).
140 See Scott Woolley, Replacing Inventory with Information, FORBES, March 24, 1997, at
54 (explaining how companies such as Cisco Systems and Proctor & Gamble are gaining cost
advantages though Intranets). See generally The Intranet Ad.van.tage: The Ultimate Computer
Solution, INC., Jan. 1, 1997, at 71 (defining what an Intranet is, how it operates and the advan-
tages of using the system).
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commercial efficiency while recognizing the uniqueness of the Inter-
net environment.
C. Article 2B & The Promotion of Commercial Efficiency on the
Internet
As both the common law and the current version of the U.C.C.
prove inadequate to provide a satisfactory rule regime for Internet
commerce, new laws should be promulgated that recognize the
uniqueness of service transactions over the Internet. The best effort
thus far in this regard has been the joint effort undertaken by
NCCUSL and ALI in drafting a new U.C.C. Article for computer in-
formation transactions. 141  Article 2B addresses most of the issues
discussed above and provides an understandable and practical frame-
work for application to Internet commerce.
While service contracts on the Internet can be written to comply
with both the U.C.C. and common law offer and acceptance provi-
sions by requiring explicit acceptance to the contract terms before
completing acceptance, a better solution would be to use the more
liberal provisions proposed in Article 2B.'42 Section 2B-203A(a) al-
141 While section 2B-103(a) limits the scope of Article 2B to "computer information trans-
actions," Article 2B can also be applied to service transactions in general by consent of the
parties under 2B-103(d). See Article 2B, supra note 5, § 2B-103(d). Section 2B-102(a)(9) de-
fines "computer information transaction" as:
[A] license or other contract whose subject matter is (i) the creation or development
of, including the transformation of information into, computer information or (ii) to
provide access to, acquire, transfer, use, license, modify, or distribute computer in-
formation. The term does not include a contract for distribution of information in
print form, such as in a book, newspaper or magazine, or to create information for
the purpose of distribution in print form even if the information provided for distri-
bution pursuant to the contract is delivered in electronic form.
Id. § 2B-102(a)(9). "Computer information" is defined as "information, including software, that
is in a form directly capable of being processed or used by, or obtained from or through, a com-
puter, but does not include information referred to in Section 2B-104(2)." Id. § 2B-102(a)(8).
Thus, software is merely one type of computer information, and thus the services mentioned
above, including the financial and banking services would almost certainly be included under
Article 2B.
142 Section 2B-203 states:
Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language of the offer or the cir-
cumstances, the following rules apply:
(1) An offer to make a contract invites acceptance in any manner and by any medium
reasonable under the circumstances.
(2) An order or other offer for prompt or current delivery of a copy invites accep-
tance either by a prompt promise to ship or by the prompt or current shipment of a
conforming or nonconforming copy. However, a shipment of nonconforming copies
is not an acceptance if the party providing the shipment seasonably notifies the other
party that the shipment is offered only as an accommodation to that party.
Id. § 2B-203 (1), (2). Section 2B-204 provides the contract formation rules for automated trans-
actions:
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lows acceptance of an offer even if the acceptance "contains terms
that vary from the terms of the offer unless the acceptance materially
conflicts with a material term of the offer or materially varies from
the terms of the offer."' 43 This section follows current law as em-
bodied in U.C.C. section 2-207(1) 144 by allowing formation of a con-
tract even when the acceptance contains varying terms and permitting
the offer to control the terms of the contract unless there is a conflict
concerning a material term. 45
In an automated transaction, the following rules apply:
(1) A contract may be formed by the interaction of electronic agents. A contract is
formed if the interaction results in the electronic agents' engaging in operations that
confirm or indicate the existence of a contract unless the operations resulted from
electronic mistake, fraud or the like.
(2) A contract may be formed by the interaction of an electronic agent and an indi-
vidual. A contract is formed if the individual takes actions or makes a statement that
the individual has reason to know will:
(A) cause the agent to perform, provide benefits, permit the use or access that is
the subject of the contract, or instruct a person or an electronic agent to do so;
or
(B) indicate acceptance or an offer, regardless of other expressions or actions
by the individual to which the electronic agent cannot react.
(3) The terms of the contract formed under paragraph (2) are determined under Sec-
tion 2B-207 or 2B-208, as applicable, but do not include terms provided by the indi-
vidual if it had reason to know that the electronic agent could not react to the terms
as provided.
Id. § 213-204.
143 See id. § 2B-203A(a).
14 See supra note 24.
14- Section 2B-203A states:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 2B-203B, a definite and seasonable ex-
pression of acceptance operates as an acceptance, even if the acceptance contains
terms that vary from the terms of the offer, unless the acceptance materially conflicts
with a material term of the offer or materially varies from the terms-of the offer.
(b) If the acceptance materially conflicts with or materially varies the offer, the fol-
lowing rules apply:
(1) A contract is not formed unless all the other circumstances, including the
conduct of the parties, indicate that an agreement existed.
(2) If a contract is formed under paragraph (1), the terms of the contract are
determined:
(A) under Section 2B-207 or 2B-208 as applicable, if one party agreed, by
manifesting assent or otherwise, to the other party's terms other than by the
acceptance that contained the varying terms; or
(B) under Section 2B-209, if subparagraph (A) does not apply and the con-
tract is formed by conduct.
(c) If the offer and acceptance contain varying terms but the variation or conflict was
not material, a contract is formed and the following rules apply:
(1) The terms of the contract are those of the offer.
(2) Nonmaterial additional terms contained in the acceptance are treated as
proposals for additional terms.
(3) Between merchants, the proposed additional terms become part of the con-
tract unless the offeror gives notice of objection before or within a reasonable
time after it receives notice of the proposed terms.
Article 2B, supra note 5, § 2B-203A.
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A second advantage of Article 2B is that it would allow Internet
service and information vendors to avoid the confusion of the U.C.C.
and the common law's different interpretations of the terms of a con-
tract. While U.C.C. section 2-207 has been an improvement over the
common law's mirror image requirement, sections 2B-207 and 2B-
208 help clarify the confusion as to what additional or different terms
are incorporated into the contract. Unlike section 2-207 in the
U.C.C., section 2B-207 does not address the formation issue but
merely prescribes what terms become part of the contract.146  This
new section would enforce the terms of clickwrap licenses on the
Internet if the customer assents to the record before using or accessing
the information. 147 Section 2B-208(a) allows for the enforcement of
mass-market licenses if a party manifests its assent, or by its conduct
assents to the license.148 Despite the fact that the terms of the contract
146 Contact formation under Article 2B is governed by section 2B-202, which states:
(a) A contract may be formed in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including
by offer and acceptance, or by conduct of both parties or operations of electronic
agents which recognize the existence of a contract.
(b) An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract may be found even if the time
that the agreement was made cannot be determined.
(c) Even if one or more terms are left open or to be agreed upon, a contract does not
fail for indefiniteness if the parties intended to make a contract and there is a rea-
sonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.
(d) In the absence of conduct or performance by both parties to the contrary, a con-
tract is not formed if there is a material disagreement about a material term, includ-
ing scope.
(e) If a term is to be fixed by later agreement and the parties intend not to be bound
unless the term is so fixed, a contract is not formed if the parties subsequently do not
agree to the term. In that case, each party shall return or, with the consent of the
other party, destroy all copies of information and other materials already received,
and return any contract fee paid for which performance has not been received. The
parties remain bound by any contractual use restriction with respect to information or
copies received or made under the contract and not returned or returnable to the other
party.
l § 2B-202.
147 Section 2B-207 states:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 2B-208, a party adopts the terms of a re-
cord, including a standard form, if it agrees to the record, by manifesting assent or
otherwise.
(b) Adoption of the terms of a record between parties may occur after commence-
ment of performance or use under their agreement if they had reason to know that
their agreement would be represented in whole or in part by a later record to be
agreed, but at the time performance or use commenced there was no opportunity to
review the record or a copy of it or it had not been completed.
(c) If a party adopts the terms of a record, those terms become part of the contract
without regard to the party's knowledge or understanding of individual terms in the
record, except for a term that is unenforceable because it fails to satisfy another re-
quirement of this article.
Id. § 2B-207.
148 Section 2B-208(a) states: "A party adopts the terms of a mass-market license for pur-
poses of Section 2B-207 only if the party agrees to the license, by manifesting assent or other-
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are not without limitation, section 2B-208(a) does provide certain
protections to consumers as it provides that a term does not become
part of the contract if it is unconscionable or conflicts with a prior
negotiated agreement between the parties. 149 While sections 2B-207
and 2B-208 deal with single form cases, section 2B-209 carries over
the general context of section 2-207(3) and establishes the terms of a
contract formed by conduct of the parties. 150 Section 2B-209, similar
to its sister provision in Article 2, alleviates the problem of the battle
of forms in certain situations. For instance, section 2B-209 allows a
contract to be formed even if the forms of the parties materially dis-
agree, if the court finds a contract was formed by conduct. 151
One serious potential drawback of Article 2B is that its provisions
may have strong negative repercussions on consumers like the Hills
in Hill. Section 2B-207, for example, provides that a party may adopt
the terms of a standard form by manifesting assent to those terms
without regard to the party's knowledge or understanding of those
terms. 52  Section 2B-111 defines "manifesting assent" and the Hill's
retention of the goods would fit within this definition since the failure
of the Hills to return the computer would constitute acceptance if the
wise, before or during the party's initial performance or use of or access to the information." Id.
§ 2B-208(a).
149 Section 2B-208(a)(1), (2) states: "A term is not part of the license: (1) if the term is un-
conscionable under Section 2B-I 10 or is unenforceable under Section 2B-105(a) or (b); or (2)
subject to Section 2B-301, if the term conflicts with terms to which the parties to the license
expressly agreed." Id. § 2B-208(a)(1), (2).
15o Compare id. § 2B-209, which states:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (b) and (c) and subject to Section
2B-301, if a contract is formed solely by conduct of the parties, in determining the
terms of the contract, a court shall consider the terms and conditions to which the
parties agreed, course of performance, course of dealing or usage of trade, the nature
of the parties' conduct, the records exchanged, the information or informational
rights involved, the supplementary terms of [the Uniform Commercial Code] which
apply to the transaction, and all other relevant circumstances.
(b) If there is no agreement on, or if there is a material disagreement about, a mate-
rial element of scope, a contract is not formed by conduct. (c) This section does not
apply if the parties authenticate a record of the agreement, a party adopts the record
of the other party, or there was an effective conditional offer under Section 2B-203
to which the party to be bound agreed, by manifesting assent or otherwise."),
with U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (1995), which states:
Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient to
establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not otherwise es-
tablish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract consist of those
terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary
terms incorporated under any other provisions of this Act.
151 See supra note 150; see also Article 2B, supra note 5, § 2B-209, Reporter's Note 3
("Subsection (a) directs the court to review the entire circumstances in such cases, regardless of
which form was first received or sent, but including the terms of the exchanged records and
established trade usage, course of dealing, and course of performance as relevant circum-
stances.") (emphasis added).
152 See supra note 147.
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form stated such retention constituted acceptance. 153  Furthermore,
even if a court had found Hill's telephone order to be an offer and the
shipment an acceptance, the result in Hill would remain unchanged
because section 2B-203(b)(1), (2) would allow the court to find that
the Hills manifested their assent to the terms of Gateway's standard
form- 54 Consumers like the Hills would then be left to the uncertain
possibility that a court will find some of the more egregious terms to
be unconscionable. 155
A third advantage of the proposed Article is the damage provisions
in sections 2B-708156 and 2B-709 157 which provide more appropriate
153 Section 2B-11l(a) states:
A person or electronic agent manifests assent to a record or term in a record if the
person, acting with knowledge of, or after having an opportunity to review the rec-
ord, term or a copy of it, or if the electronic agent, after having had an opportunity to
review:
(1) authenticates the record or term;
(2) in the case of the conduct or statements of a person, the person intends to
engage in the conduct or make the statement and has reason to know that the
other party may infer from the conduct or statement that the person assents to
the record or term; or
(3) in the case of operations of an electronic agent, the electronic agent engages
in operations that the circumstances clearly indicate constitute acceptance.
Article 2B, supra note 5, § 2B-1Il(a); see also id. § 2B-111, Reporter's Note 5 ("As in the
Restatement, failure to act is conduct and constitutes assent if the party that fails to act has rea-
son to know this will create an inference of assent.").
1
-
4 See supra note 145.
155 Section 2B-110 states:
(a) If a court as a matter of law finds the contract or any term of the contract to have
been unconscionable at the time it was made, the court may refuse to enforce the
contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
term, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any
unconscionable result.
(b) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any term thereof
may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to pre-
sent evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in
making the determination.
Article 2B, supra note 5, § 2B-110.
156 Section 2B-708 states:
(a) For purposes of this section, a "substitute transaction" is a transaction by the li-
censor which would not have been possible in the absence of the licensee's breach
and which is in the same information or informational rights with the same contrac-
tual use restrictions as the transaction to which the licensee's breach applies.
(b) Subject to Section 2B-707, if there is a breach of contract by a licensee, the licen-
sor may recover the following as compensation for the loss resulting in the ordinary
course from the particular breach or, if appropriate, as to the entire contract, less ex-
penses saved as a result of the breach to the extent not otherwise accounted for under
this section:
(1) damages measured in any combination of the following ways but not to ex-
ceed the contract fee and the market value of other consideration required un-
der the contract for the performance that was the subject of the breach:
(A) the amount of accrued and unpaid contract fees and the market value of
other consideration earned but not received for:.
(i) any performance accepted by the licensee; and
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relief to parties in transactions involving software. Unlike the current
Article 2 provisions in the U.C.C., these proposed damage provisions
satisfy the expectation interests of both parties by using present value
(ii) any performance to which Section 2B-604 applies;
(B) for performances not governed by subparagraph (A), if the licensee re-
pudiated or wrongfully refused the performance or the licensor rightfully
canceled and the breach makes possible a substitute transaction, the amount
of loss as determined by the following:
(i) contract fees and the market value of other consideration required
under the contract for the performance less the contract fees and market
value of other consideration received from an actual and commercially
reasonable substitute transaction entered into by the licensor in good
faith and without unreasonable delay; or
(ii) contract fees and the market value of other consideration required
under the contract for the performance less the market value of a com-
mercially reasonable hypothetical substitute transaction.
(C) for performances not covered by paragraph (1)(A), if the breach does
not make possible a substitute transaction, lost profit, including in the cal-
culation reasonable overhead, that the licensor would have realized on ac-
ceptance and full payment for performance that was not delivered to the li-
censee because of the licensee's breach; or
(D) damages calculated in any reasonable manner; and
(2) any consequential and incidental damages.
Id. § 2B-708.
157 Section 2B-709 states:
(a) Subject to Section 2B-707 and subsection (b), if there is a breach by a licensor,
the licensee may recover the following as compensation for the loss resulting in the
ordinary course from the particular breach or, if appropriate, as to the entire contract,
less expenses saved as a result of the breach to the extent not otherwise accounted for
under this section:
(1) damages measured in any combination of the following ways, but not to ex-
ceed the contract fee for the performance that was the subject of the breach plus
restitution of any amounts paid for performance not received and not accounted
for within the indicated recovery:
(A) with respect to performance that has been accepted and the acceptance
has not been rightfully revoked, the value of the performance required less
the value of the performance accepted as of the time and place of accep-
tance;
(B) with respect to performance that has not been rendered or that was
rightfully refused or acceptance of which was rightfully revoked:
(i) the amount of any payments made and the value of other considera-
tion given to the licensor with respect to that performance and not pre-
viously returned to the licensee;
(ii) the market value of the performance less the contract fee for that
performance; or
(iii) the cost of a commercially reasonable substitute transaction less
the contract fee under the breached contract, if the substitute transaction
was actually entered into by the licensee in good faith and without un-
reasonable delay for substantially similar information with the same
contractual use restrictions,; [sic] or
C) damages calculated in any reasonable manner; and
(2) incidental and consequential damages.
(b) The amount of damages must be reduced by any unpaid contract fees for per-
formance by the licensor which has been accepted by the licensee and as to which
the acceptance has not been rightfully revoked.
Id. § 2B-709.
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as a method to value performance. Carrying over the hypothetical of
the software designer or of an information provider such as ProCD
whose proprietary information was significantly harmed, both parties
could recover consequential damages under section 2B-708(a) that
were previously unavailable to them under the U.C.C. Of particular
relevance is section 2B-707(c), which allows for information-related
consequential damages. 158 Thus, a seller would be provided some
compensation outside of a copyright or trademark action if the buyer
misappropriates confidential information. This should result in confi-
dentiality provisions in such contracts taking increased significance.
Finally, Article 2B eliminates the confusion regarding the applica-
bility of the statute of frauds to transactions over the Internet. Section
2B-201 replaces the requirement of a "writing" with a "record" de-
fined in section 2B-102(40) as "information inscribed on a tangible
medium or stored in an electronic or other medium and retrievable in
perceivable form., 15
9
IV. CONCLUSION
In order for service transactions to be conducted efficiently and
fairly over the Internet, there must be a framework for service provid-
ers and customers to operate that will protect the interests of both
parties, and promote the powerful medium over which these transac-
tions take place. Unfortunately, the current version of the U.C.C. and
the common law rules of contract law are inadequate in providing
such a framework. Application of each rule regime would result in
confusion and inappropriate relief in the form of damages and would
thus thwart the continued expansion of commerce over the Internet.
Article 2B, while not a perfect solution, would do much to establish a
foundation from which contracts can be efficiently written and en-
forced. States must accordingly be open to its adoption for only if
158 Section 2B-707(c) states: "The remedy for breach of contract for disclosure or misuse of
information that is a trade secret or in which the aggrieved party has a right of confidentiality
includes as consequential damages compensation for the benefit obtained as a result of the
breach." Id. § 2B-707(c).
"'g Id. § 2B-102(40).
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there is universal acceptance will it serve the purpose of a uniform
code.
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